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* Samantha Ryan 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the issue of justifiability of risk-taking with regard 
to the transmission of HIV. It considers a number of factors, such as seriousness of 
risk, likelihood of risk occurring, social utility of conduct involved, ability to use 
precautions and victim awareness of the risk and willingness to accept it, which 
combined help to determine whether the taking of a risk is reasonable or not. It argues 
that by considering the issue of justifiability in this way, it is possible to accommodate 
the wider social, psychological and public health realities of HIV. It further argues 
that a criminal law which fails to take account of such considerations is not only 
overly broad in its application but ultimately risks punishing those who are not in fact 
deserving of punishment.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century the imposition of criminal liability for the 
transmission of HIV has become an extremely topical and controversial issue in the 
UK.1 This is not surprising given that criminal prosecution for transmitting HIV, 
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 See C. Strickland, “Why Parliament should create HIV specific legislation” [2001] Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues; M. Weait & Y. Azad, “The Criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and 
Wales: Questions of Law and Policy”, (2005) 10 HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review August 2005; D. 
Warburton, “A Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising Blameworthy Behaviour 
by HIV+ Individuals” (2004) 68 Journal of Criminal Law pp. 55 -77; Terrence Higgins Trust, Criminal 
Prosecution of HIV Transmission April 2006, available from 
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which up to this point had been purely a matter of abstract academic and theoretical 
discussion, became actual reality. In 2001 Stephen Kelly became the first person to be 
convicted for sexual transmission of HIV in the UK when a Scottish court found him 
guilty of recklessly causing injury to another.2 Since the Kelly decision there have 
been seven more successful prosecutions for transmission of HIV in the UK.3 Little is 
known about the majority of these cases as guilty pleas were entered on behalf of the 
various accused. However, the judgments handed down in the contested cases of R v 
Dica4 and R v Konzani5 have provided some insight into the application of the 
criminal law in this context, with further exposition and attempts at clarification of the 
legal position to be found in the academic commentary that these decisions 
prompted.6 The current legal position will be outlined shortly. However the purpose 
of this article is not to analyse what in effect has already been said regarding criminal 
liability for HIV transmission (although this will be necessary to a certain extent), 
rather it aims to consider an issue which has generally been ignored in the case law 
and academic commentary to date.  The issue is that of justifiability of risk-taking. In 
neither Dica nor Konzani was the nature of the risk taken or whether it was reasonable 
or not to take that risk discussed. To a certain extent this lack of consideration is 
somewhat understandable. Both cases concerned high risk sexual activity 
(unprotected penetrative sexual intercourse) and neither defendant contested the 
assertion that they had acted recklessly. It is therefore not surprising that in both cases 
recklessness was effectively reduced to a consideration of the accused’s awareness of 
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Modern Law Review, pp. 121- 134; M. Weait, “Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani” 
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the risk of transmitting HIV.7 However, given that it is only the taking of an 
unjustified risk that is deemed reckless for the purposes of criminal liability,8 it is 
suggested that the failure to consider the question of justifiability, even in the context 
of high risk sexual activity, is a serious omission. Moreover, it is submitted that if 
such a narrow understanding of recklessness, one that is exclusively confined to 
awareness of the risk, continues to be applied, it will produce an approach to criminal 
liability for HIV transmission that is divorced from the complex social, psychological 
and public health realities of HIV infection and transmission.9 Whilst Weait feels it is 
inevitable that in criminal law (particularly within the context of a criminal trial) “the 
broader context of transmission is occluded”;10 this writer contends that this need not 
necessarily be the case. It is suggested that by considering the issue of justifiability of 
risk-taking it will be possible for the criminal law to take account of the wider socio-
cultural, socio-economic, physical and psychological factors associated with HIV. It 
is further contended that it is only through analysis of such factors that fair and 
balanced conclusions can be made as to whether the taking of a risk was reasonable or 
not. However before considering the issue of justifiability of risk-taking in detail it is 
necessary and useful to first describe the current legal position regarding criminal 
liability for HIV transmission. 
 
 
 
CURRENT LEGAL POSITION REGARDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR HIV 
TRANSMISSION  
 
The current legal position with respect to criminal liability for the sexual transmission 
of HIV may be briefly described as follows. A person will be guilty of a criminal 
offence if, knowing that he or she is suffering from HIV, he or she recklessly 
transmits it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflicts grievous bodily harm 
on a person from whom the risk is concealed11 and who is not consenting to it.12 This 
seemingly straightforward statement turns out, upon further analysis, to mask much 
deeper uncertainty and complexity. For instance, whilst reference is made to an 
individual’s knowledge of his or her HIV-positive status, it remains unclear whether 
                                                 
7
 Although even in this regard it could be argued that analysis was fairly limited – see S. Ryan, 
“Reckless Transmission of HIV: Knowledge and Culpability”, [2006] Criminal Law Review, pp. 981-
992.  
8
 Griew states that “recklessness refers to conscious unjustified risk-taking”. See E. Griew, 
“Consistency, Communication and Codification: Reflections on Two Mens Rea Words” in P. R. 
Glazebrook  (ed.), Reshaping the Criminal Law, (London: Steven & Jones, 1978), pp. 57 -76 at 60. See 
also G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edition, (London: Stevens & Jones, 1983) at 96. 
9
 S. Zierler & N. Krieger, “Reframing Women’s Risk: Social Inequalities and HIV infection”, (1997) 
18 Annual Review of Public Health, pp. 401-436. 
10
 M. Weait, “Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani” [2005] Criminal Law Review, pp. 
763 – 772, at 771. 
11
 Weait questions how the phrase “from whom the risk is concealed” used by Judge LJ in Dica [2004] 
QB 1257, at 1273 is to be interpreted arguing that “if this is interpreted as ‘from whom he has 
concealed the risk’ then the fact that a partner knows his HIV-positive stance would not preclude a 
conviction”. Weait suggests that this would be an “odd” interpretation and that a conviction on such 
facts would be wrong in law – see “Dica: knowledge, consent and the transmission of HIV”, (2004) 
New Law Journal 28, pp. 826 –827 at 827.  
12
 See R v Dica [2004] Q.B. 1257, at 1273 per Judge LJ. In Scotland it seems that the offence charged 
will be that of recklessly causing injury - see HMA v Kelly, Unreported, 23 February 2002. In England 
and Wales the offence with which those convicted have so far been charged with is recklessly causing 
grievous bodily harm contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861.    
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knowledge in this context means actual knowledge (i.e. knowing for certain that one 
has HIV having been medically diagnosed) or whether it includes knowledge as to the 
risk that one may be infected.13 Academic commentary has been divided on this issue 
with Weait and Azad on the one hand, interpreting the Dica case as requiring actual 
knowledge,14 but with Spencer, on the other hand, stating that the decision in Dica 
meant that criminal liability could be imposed “where one partner, knowing that he is 
infected or he may be, fails to take precautions and infects a trusting partner who is 
unaware of it.”15 The case of Adaye16 creates further confusion as it seems that the 
accused in that case, who pleaded guilty to a charge of recklessly inflicting grievous 
bodily harm contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, had 
never actually been tested for HIV. When sentencing the defendant in Adaye Judge 
David Lynch stated that the accused “knew it was highly likely, if not certain” that he 
was HIV-positive.17  
The issue of consent and its relationship to concealment or failure to disclose 
is also somewhat unclear. In Dica the Court of Appeal held that consent by a sexual 
partner to run the risk of infection could provide a defence to a criminal charge of 
recklessly transmitting HIV.18 In Konzani it was made clear that in order to operate as 
a defence the consent given had to be “informed”.19 It was further stated in Konzani 
that “there is a critical distinction between taking a risk of the various, potentially 
adverse and possibly problematic consequences of sexual intercourse, and giving an 
informed consent to the risk of infection with a fatal disease”.20 Whether this 
distinction can validly be made is questionable. The writer is inclined to agree with 
Weait’s suggestion that this reasoning is based on “faulty logic” and that “it is at least 
arguable that a person who agrees to have unprotected sex with a person about whose 
HIV status they are uncertain consents to the risk of transmission by the very act of 
agreeing to have unprotected sex”.21 Whether prior disclosure of HIV-positive status 
by the person infected is required in order for a sexual partner’s consent to operate as 
a defence is also somewhat unclear.   In Dica it was stated that consent to sexual 
intercourse, which as a result of the infected person’s concealment was given in 
ignorance of the fact of that person’s condition, did not amount to consent to the risk 
of being infected.22 Whilst this seems to suggest that disclosure of infected status must 
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 See S. Ryan, supra n.7. Ryan also contends that the law is unclear as to whether the accused must 
have knowledge regarding methods of transmission of HIV before he/she can be deemed reckless. The 
Crown Prosecution Service in its Consultation Paper “Draft Policy for prosecuting cases involving 
sexual transmission of infections which cause grievous bodily harm” (September, 2006), states that the 
defendant’s knowledge and understanding of his/her infection and its communicability may be relevant 
to the issue of recklessness. A copy of the consultation paper is available from 
http://www.ukcoalition.org/laws/cps/cps06.htm accessed on March 27 2007.   
14
 See M. Weait, “Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica”, (2005) 68 Modern 
Law Review, pp. 121-134 at 131 and M. Weait & Y. Azad, supra n.1. 
15
 J.R. Spencer, “Retrial for Reckless Infection”, (2004) New Law Journal 762 (my emphasis). See 
further S. Ryan, supra n.7.  
16
 Reported in The Times, January 10, 2004; The Guardian, January 13, 2004. See C. Dodd et al, 
Grievous harm? Use of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for sexual transmission of HIV, 
(Sigma Research, 2005). 
17
 See P. Broster, “HIV Asylum Fiend Jailed for six years”, The Express, January 13, 2004.  
18
 R v Dica, supra n.4. Judge LJ made clear that according to the principles laid down in R v Brown 
[1994] 1 A.C. 212 consent would not provide a defence to a charge of intentional transmission of HIV.   
19
 See R v Konzani, supra n.5, at para 41 per Judge LJ. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 M. Weait, supra n.10, at 765. This issue will be discussed further in the penultimate section on 
victim’s awareness of the risk and willingness to accept it.  
22
 Supra n.4, at 1268. 
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be made before consent can provide a defence, the Court appears not to have gone 
quite this far.23 By recognising that “the ultimate question is not knowledge, but 
consent”,24 the Court appeared to countenance that in certain circumstances the 
defence of consent might be available in the absence of disclosure by the infected 
person.25 This seems to be the right approach to take. Individuals can be aware of the 
risk of HIV transmission even without disclosure by their sexual partner and, if with 
such knowledge they consent to sexual intercourse, they must be treated as consenting 
to the risk of infection.26   However, in Konzani a much more restrictive approach was 
taken to this issue.27 In Konzani Judge LJ suggested that concealment of one’s HIV-
positive status almost inevitably meant that one’s sexual partner was deceived and 
that in such circumstances any consent given was not properly informed.28 Whilst it 
was accepted that an honest belief in consent would provide a defence, Judge LJ 
stated that “silence in these circumstances [i.e. where an individual knows they are 
infected but does not make his or her partner aware of this and engages in unprotected 
sexual intercourse] is incongruous with honesty, or with a genuine belief that there is 
an informed consent”.29 Furthermore, although the Court appears to accept that there 
may be circumstances where, notwithstanding the failure to disclose, a complainant 
could nevertheless have given an informed consent or an accused could have an 
honest belief in consent, the circumstances in which the court suggests that either may 
be a possibility are, as the following extract from the case demonstrates, extremely 
limited: 
 
By way of example, an individual with HIV may develop a sexual relationship with someone who 
knew him while he was in hospital, receiving treatment for the condition. If so, her informed consent, if 
it were indeed informed, would remain a defence, to be disproved by the prosecution, even if the 
defendant had not personally informed her of his condition. Even if she did not in fact consent, this 
example would illustrate the basis for an argument that he honestly believed in her informed consent. 
Alternatively, he may honestly believe that his new sexual partner was told of his condition by 
someone known to them both.30  
 
As Weait has noted, the examples provided are ones in which disclosure is effectively 
made albeit either through context (the hospital setting) or a third party and not by the 
infected individual.31 By reasoning thus the Court of Appeal “effectively” precludes 
the possibility of consent or honest belief operating as a defence in the absence of 
                                                 
23
 Although Pedain suggests that the reasoning in Dica was open to two possible interpretations. One, 
the “informed consent” reading under which a person who remains ignorant of their partner’s HIV 
status can never be said in law to consent to the risk of transmission. A second possible reading, which 
Pedain terms the “liability restricting” reading would recognise that a valid consent could be given 
even where disclosure has not been made. See A. Pedain, “HIV and Responsible Sexual behaviour”, 
(2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 540 –543 at 540/541. 
24
 Supra n.4, at 1273. 
25
 See M. Weait, supra n.10, at 764 onwards. 
26
 M. Weait, supra n.14, at 127/128 provides a number of examples where such knowledge may be 
held in the absence of disclosure from the person infected, for example where a hospital letter 
concerning a sexual partner’s HIV status has been seen, or where there is knowledge that one’s partner 
has previously been sexually active with a group that did not practise safer sex. 
27
 Supra n.5. 
28
 Supra n.5, para 42.  
29
 Ibid. Judge LJ further stated at paragraph 45 that a defendant’s honest belief in the alleged victim’s 
consent would only provide a defence where that belief was concomitant with the consent which 
provides a defence. 
30
 Supra n.5, para 44. 
31
 M. Weait, supra n. 10, at 767. 
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disclosure by the person infected.32 It rejects any attempt to rely on general 
knowledge as to the risks of unprotected sexual intercourse as potentially indicating 
acceptance of the risk of HIV transmission. Furthermore it seems to suggest that even 
conscious advertence by a person to the possibility that a non-disclosing partner may 
be HIV-positive will not provide the person who transmits HIV with a defence.33   
  It appears that there is still much uncertainty as to what the precise legal 
position is with regard to liability for HIV transmission. Moreover there is a great deal 
that has yet to be considered before a justifiable approach to criminal liability for HIV 
transmission can be found. Issues such as difficulty of disclosure, whether disclosure 
is necessary if precautions are taken and whether non-disclosure can be justified in 
certain situations must be discussed. Whether the use of precautions will preclude a 
finding of recklessness and the difficulties surrounding the negotiation of condom use 
must be considered. The sexuality of people with HIV, the reality of sexual 
encounters and the concept of safer sex (as opposed to abstinence) must also be 
examined. There is a danger that in the absence of consideration of these wider issues 
a very narrow, cold and unrealistic approach to criminal liability for HIV transmission 
will be adopted in which a common sense pragmatic view of what constitutes ‘proper’ 
conduct in sexual relations, that is largely at odds with the reality of sexual behaviour 
and sexual encounters, will prevail. It is hoped that by examining justifiability of risk-
taking a better accommodation can be reached between the reality of sexual 
transmission of HIV and the legal approach to punishing such transmission. Some 
accommodation is necessary as without it both compliance with the law and respect 
for it will be seriously undermined.34   
 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF RISK-TAKING 
 
Risk is a part of all of our lives, and we disagree with one another about what risks are worth taking.35 
 
Risks vary in a number of ways - they vary in type, extent and character.36 Some risk-
taking is justifiable, and some is not. For the purpose of criminal liability it has long 
been accepted that a person is reckless and therefore subject to criminal sanction if the 
risk he/she takes is one that no reasonable person would take in the circumstances.37 
In R v Stephenson, Geoffrey Lane LJ said that to be reckless the “risk must be one 
which in all the circumstances it is unreasonable to take”.38 Normally the 
reasonableness or justifiability of a risk is determined through consideration of a 
number of factors: the seriousness of the risk of harm, the likelihood of the risk 
occurring, the social utility of the conduct involved, what precautions could be taken 
                                                 
32
 Ibid, at 766.  
33
 See generally M. Weait, supra n.10, at 768. 
34
 See Z. Lazzarini, S. Bray & S. Burris, Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk 
Behaviour (Centre for Laws and the Public’s Health at John Hopkins and Georgetown Universities; 
June 19, 2002) who comment upon the importance of the law reflecting the norms of behaviour among 
HIV-positive people in order to ensure compliance with the law and ensure that people with HIV do 
not feel that the law being applied is unfair or discriminatory.  
35
 D. Ainslie, “AIDS and Sex: Is Warning a Moral Obligation?” (2002) 10 Health Care Analysis, pp. 
49-66, at 55.   
36
 S. Shute, “Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law” in S. Shute & A.P. Simester (eds.), Criminal 
Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 171- 206, at 
181.  
37
 See J.R.  Spencer, “Liability for Reckless Infection: Part 1” (2004) New Law Journal, pp. 384 -385 at 
385.   
38
 [1979] Q.B. 695, at 703 per Geoffrey Lane LJ. 
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to avoid the risk, and whether or not the potential victim is aware of the risk and 
willing to accept it.39 It is only by considering these various factors that it is possible 
to determine which risks are acceptable to society and which are not. Although 
recklessness is itself a subjective state of mind,40 it should be noted that evaluation of 
these criteria is a matter of objective assessment.41  
Why, given their centrality to the assessment of whether the taking of a risk is 
justifiable, these factors have not been considered in the case law or much of the 
commentary to date is unclear. A possible explanation for this failure is that it has 
simply been assumed, without any further analysis or consideration, that the taking of 
any and every risk in relation to HIV transmission is unjustifiable. Evidence that this 
assumption has in fact been made can be gleaned from some of the academic 
commentary. For instance, Warburton has expressed the view that unprotected 
intercourse with a HIV-positive person is a risk that can never be justified.42 Weait, 
for the purposes of his paper “Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v 
Dica” assumes that risk-taking with respect to HIV transmission will in most 
instances be unjustifiable.43 Indeed it is arguable that in both Dica44 and Konzani45 all 
parties involved - judges, prosecutors, defence counsel and defendants alike - 
presumed that justifiability or reasonableness of risk was not a contestable issue. In 
Dica, there was evidence that the defendant knew he had HIV and it was not disputed 
that on the majority of occasions, sexual intercourse was unprotected. In light of this 
evidence Judge LJ in the Court of Appeal stated that “[r]ecklessness as such was not 
in issue”.46 It seems that recklessness would only have become an issue in Dica if 
protective measures had been consistently used.47 In Konzani the defendant himself 
admitted that he had acted recklessly by having a sexual relationship with the three 
complainants without using a condom every time he had sexual intercourse with 
them.48 Whether the risk taken (having unprotected sexual intercourse) was justifiable 
or reasonable was not mentioned or discussed in either of these cases.  
                                                 
39
 See J.R. Spencer, supra n.37, at 384. R. Elliott in Criminal Law & HIV/AIDS: Final Report 
(Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and Canadian AIDS Society, Montreal, 1996) says that in 
assessing whether the taking of a given risk is justified a court will consider the magnitude of the risk, 
the gravity of the potential harm and the social value of the activity carrying the risk. See further the 
Law Commission. No 31. Working Paper on the Mental element in Crime, p 53 and C.M.V. Clarkson 
& H.M. Keating, Criminal Law Text and Materials, 5th edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 
146. 
40
 The traditional subjective test of recklessness was established in R v Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396. 
The objective test set out in R v Caldwell [1982] A.C. 341 was overruled by the House of Lords in R v 
G and Another [2004] 1 A.C. 1034. Although Lord Bingham appeared to confine his comments in this 
case to the offence of criminal damage. In AG’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 367 it 
was said that general principles were laid down in the R v G and Another case and that accordingly its 
reasoning was not confined to criminal damage.      
41
 G. Williams in Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edition, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983), at 98 states 
that the jury determine whether the risk was a reasonable/justifiable one for the defendant to run. See 
also A. Norrie, “Subjectivism, Objectivism and the Limits of Criminal Recklessness” (1992) 12 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 45-58.   
42
 D. Warburton, supra n.1, at 63.  
43
 See M. Weait, supra n.14, at 130. Of course Weait’s decision not to consider the issue of 
justifiability on this occasion may be partly explained by the fact that in this article he is commenting 
on the decision in Dica which did not address the issue of justifiability of risk at all.    
44
 Supra n.4. 
45
 Supra n.5.  
46
 Supra n.4, at 1261.  
47
 Ibid. The use of precaution will be discussed further later on in the paper. 
48
 Supra n.5, at para 4. 
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However some commentators have directly engaged with the question of 
justifiability of risk-taking in the context of sexual relations and HIV transmission.  
Bennett, Draper and Frith observed that: 
 
At some point in the widespread debate about HIV transmission, we must explore the relative worth 
which is to be attached to sexual expression and sexual gratification. … If sexual expression and 
gratification are extremely valuable, then some known or un-known risk-taking may be justified with 
reference to the good that such sex bestows on the individuals concerned.49 
 
In his commentary on the Konzani case Pedain questions whether the defendant 
admitted recklessness too willingly observing that: 
 
the concept of recklessness is based on the notion that the defendant (knowingly) takes more than a 
socially acceptable risk. Built into this is the idea that there are some risks to which one must not 
expose others, and other risks which an agent can ignore because it is up to those potentially affected 
by them to protect themselves against these risks if they so wish. In deciding what is criminally 
reckless, the courts will have to think clearly and critically about the proper distribution of risks and 
responsibilities between consenting sexual partners.50 
 
Yet it is not only the worth to be attached to sexual expression and the distribution of 
risk and responsibilities between sexual partners that needs to be considered, it is all 
of the factors as outlined above – the seriousness of the risk, the likelihood of the risk 
occurring, the social utility of the conduct involved, the precautions that could be 
taken and the victim’s awareness of and willingness to accept the risk. Each will be 
looked at in turn, although it must be borne in mind that to reach a decision as to 
justifiability all the factors must be considered together. 
 
 
SERIOUSNESS OF RISK  
 
It is important to firstly clarify that ‘seriousness of risk’ here refers to the seriousness 
of HIV infection for an individual and not the likelihood (or degree of risk) that HIV 
will be transmitted. Likelihood of transmission will be dealt with later in the paper. In 
relation to seriousness of HIV infection it is not for one moment denied that HIV is a 
grave, complex and chronic medical condition.51 It is therefore accepted that taking a 
risk of transmitting HIV constitutes the taking of a serious risk. However there is a 
great danger that in the context of HIV fear, stigma and outdated medical information 
(or simple lack of knowledge) may result in an overestimation of seriousness.52 So 
whilst it is recognised that HIV is a serious long term condition, it is submitted that it 
is wrong to speak of it as a death sentence.53 Infection with HIV today is different 
from being infected in the eighties and nineties.54 Improvements during the last 
decade or so in the quality of life of persons diagnosed with HIV have been 
                                                 
49
 R. Bennett, H. Draper, & L. Frith, “Ignorance is Bliss? HIV and moral duties and legal duties to 
forewarn”, (2002) 26 Journal of Medical Ethics, pp. 9-15, at 14. 
50
 A. Pedain, supra n.17, at 542. 
51
 See Health Protection Agency, A Complex Picture, HIV and other Sexually Transmitted Infections in 
the UK: 2006 (Health Protection Agency, November 2006). 
52
 See National AIDS Trust & Terrence Higgins Trust, Assaults and Other offences Against the Person 
– Sentencing Advisory Panel Consultation, (NAT/THT, November 2005), at 2.  
53
 See C. Dodd et al, supra n.16 and National AIDS Trust Policy Update, Criminal Prosecution of HIV 
Transmission, July 2005. 
54
 M.A. Schlitz, & Th. G. M. Sandfort, “HIV-positive people, risk and sexual behaviour” (2000) 50 
Social Science & Medicine, pp. 1571-1588, at 1576. 
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profound.55 Furthermore, combination therapy has greatly reduced AIDS deaths and 
has extended significantly the life expectancies of people with HIV.56 Indeed recent 
research has found that the large proportion of HIV-positive people who respond well 
to anti-retroviral therapy have the same mortality rates as those of the general 
population.57 It is important to bear these facts in mind when considering the correct 
approach to criminal liability for HIV transmission. If, when determining the 
seriousness of HIV infection, HIV is treated as a death sentence, then it will be 
impossible to argue that running a risk of transmission may ever be justified. 
However, if infection with HIV is seen as a serious risk, then there is some room for 
discussion as the taking of a serious risk can sometimes be justified when other 
factors, such as social utility and likelihood of the risk occurring, are taken into 
account.         
 
SOCIAL UTILITY   
 
Whether a risk is justified is often decided by reference to the social utility of the 
conduct involved. If there is high social value in an activity then the taking of risk 
may be more acceptable than if the conduct has no social value. In the context of 
risking HIV transmission the value given to sexual expression and gratification is 
extremely important. As Bennett, Draper and Frith have commented: 
 
If sexual expression and gratification can only be afforded very conditional value then it may indeed be 
wrong knowingly to take risks with HIV transmission to achieve even substantial sexual expression 
and gratification. Likewise, it may also be wrong to place one’s concerns to protect one’s highly valued 
sex life above one’s concerns to protect one’s partner against transmission.58   
 
Consensual sexual activity is generally accepted to be of great personal and social 
benefit. According to H.L.A. Hart, sexual impulses form an integral part of each 
person’s day-to-day life such that their suppression can affect “the development or 
balance of the individual’s emotional life, happiness, and personality”.59 The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Cuerrier stated that “consensual sexual intercourse 
is seen as serving a positive social purpose, linking individuals together for pleasure, 
intimacy and procreation”.60  However, whilst the importance of sexual expression, 
privacy and autonomy has generally been recognised, commitment to such ideals can 
begin to waver when HIV is also an issue. Indeed, in the early days of the epidemic 
there was a tendency to underestimate the importance of sexual relations for HIV-
positive people and to effectively deny those infected their sexuality. Schlitz and 
Sandfort suggest that this was possibly understandable when HIV first became 
known, as infection with the disease was seen as a death sentence.61 However, with 
medical advances in treatment and greater life expectancy for those infected, the 
sexuality of HIV-positive people could no longer be ignored. Schlitz and Sandfort 
argue that not only must the sexuality of HIV-positive people be acknowledged but 
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that it must also be recognised “as positive, healthy and life-affirming”.62 Not all 
would share this view; for instance Warburton suggests that unprotected intercourse 
between a HIV-positive person and someone uninfected is unjustifiable.63 Yet this 
cannot be correct. Outright denial of the right of a HIV-positive person to engage in 
unprotected intercourse, even when his or her sexual partner consents, is quite simply 
wrong and would result in an unnecessary and unjustifiable intrusion by the criminal 
law into what is (or should be) essentially a private matter.64 As Smith has 
commented “[a]ttempting to proscribe sexual activity completely is not only inhuman 
but an unrealistically extreme expectation, more likely to discredit the law than 
achieve observance”.65 Moreover, this is not the approach taken by the UK courts. In 
Dica and Konzani it was recognised that a person may consent to run the risk of 
infection with HIV. Rather than seeking to proscribe sexual activity for HIV-positive 
people the law needs to strike a balance between the protection of non-infected 
individuals from harm on the one hand, with respect for privacy and autonomy in 
matters of sex and health on the other.66 Furthermore to achieve a fair balance the law 
must give proper weight to the right to sexual expression and privacy of those infected 
with HIV. 
 
LIKELIHOOD OF RISK OCCURRING67  
 
Quantity of risk is supposed to be an important criterion of recklessness. As a general 
rule criminal law is not concerned with negligible risks.68 However, as Tadros has 
pointed out, risks are notoriously difficult to quantify.69 This may explain the general 
unwillingness within the criminal law to actively consider the likelihood of the risk 
occurring; choosing instead to punish as soon as it is accepted that ‘a risk’ of harm 
existed.70 However, as there is clear scientific data regarding the different levels of 
risk associated with different sexual activities, reluctance to engage with the question 
of risk likelihood cannot be justified in the context of HIV transmission. It is therefore 
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argued that legal assessment of risk must be based upon and be consistent with the 
best available scientific evidence regarding likelihood of HIV transmission.71 Not 
only is this the only rational way to determine which risks should attract criminal 
liability; it is also essential that such epidemiological data is taken into account as it 
forms the basis for counselling practices and public education regarding preventing 
and reducing risk of HIV infection.72 For the criminal law to either develop its own 
view regarding likelihood of occurrence or to fail to form a view on this issue, 
choosing instead to treat all sexual activity as equally risky, would be irrational and 
unfair.  
 Not only is it argued that legal assessment of risk must be based upon medical 
evidence, it is further contended that only conduct which is seen to pose a significant 
risk of transmission should be subject to criminal sanction. As Taylor observes 
“sexual activity with any partner always carries some risk of lesser or greater harm. 
Criminal law should therefore only deal with high-risk activity”.73 A number of 
commentators have expressed support for this proposition. Elliott argues that criminal 
liability should be reserved for conduct which carries a significant risk of transmission 
and further suggests that a narrow approach is warranted for defining what constitutes 
a significant risk.74 Strickland refers to punishing conduct which creates a real risk of 
transmission,75 and Spencer suggests that a person would be reckless if they exposed 
another to a “high risk” of infection.76 Interestingly it seems that the Canadian 
Supreme Court adopted such an approach to criminal liability for HIV transmission in 
the Cuerrier case holding that a defendant would be guilty of aggravated assault if, 
without disclosing his HIV-positive status, he engaged in activity that poses a 
significant risk of transmitting the virus.77 The Court considered that engaging in 
unprotected sexual intercourse created a significant risk.78 Such a view is in line with 
medical research which classifies insertive penile-vaginal intercourse without a 
condom as high risk activity.79 Unfortunately the Supreme Court in Cuerrier gave no 
further guidance as to which other sexual activities that risk transmitting HIV carry a 
high enough degree of risk to be considered legally significant and as already 
indicated the UK courts have not in the recent cases dealing with liability for HIV 
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transmission attempted to grapple with the issue of degree of risk at all.80 If, as is 
argued here, criminal liability is to be reserved for those who subject another to a 
significant risk of infection with HIV (without that other’s consent) then a clear 
understanding of precisely what constitutes a significant risk is needed 
Guidance as to what constitutes high risk activity can be obtained from the 
medical literature on HIV. Insertive or receptive penile-anal or penile–vaginal 
intercourse without a condom and receptive insertion of shared sex toys is considered 
to pose a high risk of transmission. Unprotected oral sex and sex with a condom is 
considered low risk activity and oral sex with a barrier is treated as creating a 
negligible risk.81 On the basis of such information it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that protected or unprotected oral sex and sex with a condom should remain 
outside the scope of the criminal law. The risk of infection should either be deemed 
too low to warrant criminal sanction or the fact that someone has engaged in this type 
of sexual activity, as opposed to penetrative sexual intercourse, should mean that a 
safer sex defence is available to them if charged with recklessly infecting another with 
HIV. As regards penetrative sexual intercourse, Elliott points out that unprotected 
anal or vaginal intercourse is really only high risk for the partner being penetrated and 
questions whether only the penetrating partner (in whose hands the ability to use 
precautions ultimately lies) should be subject to criminal prosecution.82 It is also 
worth noting the gender-based differences that exist as to the likelihood of 
transmitting the virus in the context of penetrative sex.83 Research has shown that the 
risk of viral transmission from an infected male to a female is far greater than the risk 
of transmission from an infected female to a male partner.84 Therefore while it may be 
acceptable to classify insertive or receptive penile-anal intercourse and insertive 
penile-vaginal intercourse as posing a significant risk of HIV transmission, there may 
be room to argue that the risks women pose to men during penile-vaginal intercourse 
are not sufficient to warrant criminal liability.85 It may be unlikely that such a position 
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would ever be adopted by the criminal law. Indeed two of the recent convictions in 
the UK for transmitting HIV involved female accused.86 However this fact (together 
with other matters such as ability to insist on the use of precautions or to engage in 
safer sex) should be borne in mind when determining whether a HIV-positive woman 
has acted in a criminally reckless manner.   
Finally it must be remembered that the likelihood of a risk occurring is not a 
decisive factor when dealing with conduct that is deemed to be of high social value. 
High risks may sometimes be justified if taken in the context of socially valuable 
activity. As Tadros has commented: 
 
High risks might be warranted where those risks are necessary for the performance of a very valuable 
activity. Lower risks are warranted for less valuable activities. Because privacy and autonomy in 
matters of sex and health are very valuable, there are stronger reasons in the context of consensual 
sexual intercourse to allow risks to be imposed on others without criminal liability arising.87 
 
Therefore the fact that a person has engaged in high risk activity on its own may not 
be enough to justify criminal sanction. It may be necessary, given the importance we 
attach to sexual gratification and expression to consider other matters such as ability 
to use precautions and ability to disclose.     
 
 
USE OF PRECAUTION 
 
Part of the calculation regarding justifiability of a risk looks at what precautions could 
have been taken to avoid the risk. If it is easy to take preventive measures then the 
failure to do so may mean that running the risk is unjustifiable. In terms of HIV, total 
abstinence from sexual relations provides the best guarantee of not infecting others. 
However as already pointed out, the sexuality of HIV-positive individuals must not be 
denied. This is why it is important to consider how use of precautions will be treated 
in law. It is proposed in the discussion which follows to concentrate upon the use of 
condoms during penetrative sexual intercourse. A number of issues arise in relation to 
this matter. Firstly, whether condom use can negate a claim of recklessness must be 
considered. It could be argued either, that condom use renders risk-taking justifiable 
or that condom use reduces the risk of transmission so as to no longer be legally 
significant. Alternatively, the use of precautions could give rise to a ‘safer sex’ 
defence. A second matter to be discussed is whether disclosure of HIV positive status 
is required before a safer sex defence may be relied upon. A final issue for 
consideration is the failure to use precaution where HIV positive status has not been 
disclosed. Whether such a failure is unjustified in all circumstances will be examined.  
 
PRECAUTION – A NEGATION OF RECKLESSNESS OR SAFER SEX 
DEFENCE? 
 
There is presently a lack of clarity as to whether the use of condoms will preclude the 
possibility of conviction.88 In Dica Lord Justice Judge observed that “[i]f protective 
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measures had been taken by the appellant that would have provided material relevant 
to the jury’s decision whether in all the circumstances recklessness was proved”.89 
Although one might interpret this comment as suggesting that the use of precautions 
would negate liability - it is not entirely clear. Whilst the statement could be read as 
saying that a person who used precautions would not be deemed reckless, it is more 
likely that Judge LJ meant that the use of precautions would simply be a factor the 
jury could take into account when determining whether the accused had in fact been 
reckless.90 In Konzani it was formally admitted on the defendant’s behalf that he had 
acted recklessly by failing to use a condom every time he had sexual intercourse with 
the complainants.91 The Court in Konzani made no distinction between protected and 
unprotected sex and provided no indication of the effect that wearing a condom would 
have on a person’s liability. This failure to clarify whether the use of condoms negates 
recklessness is particularly unfortunate as under current criminal law it is entirely 
possible that liability could be imposed even where condoms have been used. The use 
of a condom could either be treated as demonstrating an accused’s awareness of the 
risk of transmission and thereby helping establish, rather than negate, his/her criminal 
liability;92 or alternatively criminal liability could be imposed on the basis that 
notwithstanding the use of preventive measures, the person transmitting the disease 
still foresaw a slight risk that the disease may be passed on by his or her conduct.93  
However, there seem to be good reasons for not adopting either approach and instead 
allowing a HIV-positive person to avoid criminal liability by taking precautions. 
Firstly, it is generally accepted that the primary aim of any measure invoked against 
those who spread HIV must be to prevent the spread of the disease. Punishing those 
who have taken precautions would run counter to this primary aim.94 Secondly the use 
of precautions significantly reduces the risk of transmission. Medical literature 
classifies protected sexual intercourse as low risk activity.95 By using a condom (in 
the proper way) a person should be regarding as having reduced the risk of 
transmission to a level beneath the threshold for criminal liability. There is legal 
precedent for such a position, albeit in another jurisdiction. In Cuerrier, the Canadian 
Supreme Court (which as already mentioned ruled that liability should be confined to 
cases involving a significant risk of transmission) accepted that the careful use of 
condoms might be found to so reduce the risk of harm that the risk could no longer be 
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considered as significant.96 Finally, allowing the use of a condom to operate as either 
a negation of recklessness or as a defence appears to strike the right balance between 
recognising the right of those infected to sexual expression and gratification and the 
need to protect others from harm. As Smith has commented “a defence of proof of 
reasonable precautions having been taken to ensure the non-transmission of bodily 
fluids would be a proper and necessary concession to human nature”.97  
 
 
PRECAUTION – NO DISCLOSURE 
 
The necessity for disclosure of HIV positive status where precautions have been used 
must now be considered. In light of the fact that a risk, albeit it a low risk, of 
transmission still remains when condoms are used, it is at least arguable that the use 
of precautions ought not be a sufficient defence unless the person infected has also 
informed his partner of his condition.98 Warburton suggests that “even intercourse 
with the use of a prophylactic barrier in these circumstances is arguably something 
that most people would shy away from”.99 Stein et al think it likely that people would 
want to know their partner’s HIV positive status even in the context of safer sex.100 
Erin and Harris suggest there is an absolute duty to forewarn,101 whilst Ciccarone et al 
contend that the use of unilateral risk reduction strategies is ethically indefensible.102 
It is clear that this is a highly emotive issue. Indeed as Ciccarone et al have recognised 
“it is difficult to identify a more charged issue in AIDS prevention than that of 
nondisclosure of positive HIV status to sexual partners.”103 However, whilst morally 
we may expect disclosure that does not necessarily mean that the absence of it should 
lead to criminal sanction. In the case law to date disclosure has mainly been discussed 
in relation to whether ‘informed consent’ to run the risk of infection was given. 
Although in Konzani the Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that non-disclosure of 
HIV positive status helped demonstrate recklessness.104 This constitutes a significant 
expansion of the concept of recklessness (going beyond conscious unjustifiable risk-
taking to include the additional element of non-disclosure).105 However, these 
comments were made in the context of unprotected sexual intercourse, so it remains 
possible that lack of disclosure during protected intercourse will not automatically be 
deemed reckless. Furthermore, difficulty of disclosure was not considered at all in 
Konzani. In Dica Lord Justice Judge only briefly acknowledged the fact that “there 
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are significant negative consequences of disclosure of HIV”.106 Disclosure of one’s 
HIV-positive status is not as straightforward as such cursory treatment seems to 
imply.107 It is suggested that the need for disclosure must be balanced against other 
considerations, such as likelihood of the risk of transmission and difficulty of 
disclosing, before a conclusion can be reached as to whether a failure to disclose 
when precautions have been taken should give rise to criminal liability.  
As already indicated, protected penetrative sexual intercourse is considered 
low risk activity. It could therefore be argued that disclosure is not required when 
precautions have been taken given that the likelihood of transmission is significantly 
lowered.108 Bennett, Draper and Frith have argued along this line stating that “all 
sexual activity is not equally risky” and that “when the risk is low it is possible to act 
in a responsible and morally justifiable way without forewarning”.109 A similar view 
has been found to exist amongst HIV infected individuals.110 Ciccarone et al found in 
their study that most of those who had reported engaging in sex without disclosure 
also reported having only protected sex or oral sex, both of which pose less risk of 
transmission than unprotected anal or vaginal sex.111 The participants in the study 
expressed the view that disclosure was not necessary in light of the precautionary 
steps taken or the nature of the activities engaged in. Research conducted by Stein et 
al also found that HIV positive people did not disclose because they believed that they 
were not putting others at risk or were only exposing them to very low risk by 
avoiding higher risk practices.112 Interestingly this kind of reasoning was adopted by 
the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Cuerrier.113 As already mentioned Cory J in 
Cuerrier stated that the extent of the duty to disclose would increase with the risks 
attendant upon the act of intercourse and that disclosure may not be required when 
precautions had been taken.114 In all six of the seven judges in Cuerrier felt that the 
person who practices safer sex but does not disclose his/her HIV status should not be 
subject to criminal prosecution due to non-disclosure.115  So, it seems that on the basis 
of likelihood of transmission alone a valid argument could be made to the effect that 
non-disclosure can be justified (legally not necessarily morally) in the context of 
protected sexual intercourse. 
A second factor that may be relevant when seeking to determine whether non-
disclosure (combined with the use of precaution) is reckless is the difficulty of 
disclosing one’s HIV status or the possible risks associated with such disclosure. 
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Research reveals that there are many practical and psychological reasons for non-
disclosure of HIV status. The stigma and discrimination associated with HIV often 
makes disclosure extremely difficult.116 Disclosure may involve an admission of 
sexual infidelity, rape or IV drug use.117 There is a risk that one’s sexual partner may, 
if informed, reveal one’s status to others.118 A person may believe that disclosure 
would lead to rejection or abandonment.119 Disclosure may mean that a desired sexual 
encounter will not happen.120 A person may feel that it is up to his/her sexual partner 
to protect themselves if they wish to be safe121 or he/she may only feel a responsibility 
to disclose to certain sexual partners and not others.122  Finally a person may fear that 
disclosure could lead to violence, in other words disclosure may not only be difficult 
but also dangerous.123 This has been shown to be a real concern for HIV positive 
women, again raising the possibility of the need for gender specific approaches to 
criminalisation (or at least gender specific consideration). Kalichman and Nachimson 
found that HIV-seropositive women have greater difficulty disclosing their HIV status 
to sexual partners than do men.124 Sowell et al found that disclosure often triggered 
violent episodes and that the women in their study who had not disclosed their HIV 
status to anyone had considered the disclosure process to be too difficult or too 
risky.125 Given the risks and adverse social and personal consequences associated with 
disclosure it is not surprising that sex without disclosure is relatively common among 
persons living with HIV.126 Furthermore, taking precautions is generally speaking 
easier than actually disclosing and achieves the desired goal of preventing HIV 
transmission.127 It may be that by allowing non-disclosure by those who use 
precautions a better balance is struck between the need to protect a partner from 
exposure and the need to protect the person infected from the potentially negative 
outcome of disclosure.128 The criminal law should therefore recognise, given the fact 
that the risk of transmission is significantly reduced by the proper use of precautions, 
and that there may be significant risks associated with disclosure, that non disclosure 
in such a context may be justified.  
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FAILURE TO USE PRECAUTION AND FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
 
Whilst a failure to disclose may seem understandable, even excusable, in some 
situations; it is recognised that it becomes much harder to excuse or justify non-
disclosure when it is combined with a failure to use precautions. The natural 
inclination is to treat both failures as clear evidence of recklessness and ultimately 
blameworthiness. Indeed this seems to have been the approach taken by the Court of 
Appeal in Konzani. However the issue of non-disclosure when failing to use 
precautions requires more detailed consideration than this. It is suggested that there 
are two factors that should be taken into account before categorising such conduct as 
reckless. Firstly, the difficulty of disclosing one’s HIV positive status must be 
considered. This has already been discussed, however it is contended that in the 
current context under consideration (unprotected sexual intercourse) it seems 
appropriate, if this factor is to have a bearing on criminal liability, to confine this 
issue to situations where disclosure carries with it a significant risk of harm/violence 
to the infected person (not just adverse personal or social consequences). This 
qualification is thought necessary as unprotected intercourse carries with it a high risk 
of transmission. The second factor to be considered is the ability of the infected 
person to insist on the use of precautions. This has not yet been considered by a UK 
court but may be important when assessing whether a person has behaved recklessly. 
Moreover it is an issue which appears to have particular relevance for women. It is for 
this reason that in the discussion which follows emphasis is placed upon the difficulty 
HIV positive women encounter when trying to negotiate safer sex or condom use with 
a male partner.129  
A number of commentators have found that issues of gender and power can be 
central barriers to risk reduction within sexual relationships between men and 
women.130 Gender based power imbalances may mean that the female partner has 
little control over the type and frequency of sexual practices and over sexual initiation 
and refusal.131 Such power imbalances may also constrain women’s ability to 
negotiate condom use.132 Schlitz and Sandfort found that HIV positive women were 
more likely to use condoms consistently if they felt they had power to influence their 
partner’s condom use.133  However economic dependence on men has been shown to 
affect both women’s perception of their ability to influence partner’s condom use and 
their practice of attempting to do so.134 Fear of a partner’s anger in response to 
requests to use condoms has also been shown to be an important predictor of condom 
use.135 Furthermore, insistence upon condom use in this context fails to take account 
of the fact that this is a prevention method that requires male co-operation.136 The 
HIV positive woman must persuade her male partner to wear a condom and often this 
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has to be done in the context of a relationship that may be “precarious if not 
perilous”.137 It therefore seems appropriate, when considering potential criminal 
liability for HIV transmission in a case of female to male transmission, that risk 
behaviour is understood within the broader context of women’s social inequality in 
power and status.138 Account must be taken of the social cost of negotiating condom 
use and of the decreased sexual bargaining power to insist upon condom use that 
exists for many HIV positive women. In other words we should not be too quick to 
classify women who fail to use precautions as irrational risk-takers or blame them for 
risk-taking.139    
Yet it is unclear where acknowledgment of difficulties surrounding disclosure 
and inability to insist on use of precautions leads us in terms of legal punishment for 
transmission. After all, if the sexual activity in question is unprotected sexual 
intercourse, then the risk of transmission remains high despite such difficulties. One 
possible option is to construct a defence for persons who are HIV positive but are 
unable to either disclose their HIV infection or take precautions to reduce the risk to 
their sexual partner(s). Elliott is in favour of such a defence being available. He 
suggests that a reasonable apprehension of physical violence upon disclosure or upon 
attempting to negotiate use of precautions should constitute a defence to a charge of 
HIV transmission. The failure to provide such a defence would not according to 
Elliott serve to protect, but rather may impose an additional burden on those who are 
doubly disadvantaged by HIV infection (with its attendant social and economic costs) 
and by their vulnerability to violence or other abuse.140 A second, but admittedly 
much trickier option is to consider whether it is possible, in certain situations, to not 
treat as reckless the act of engaging in unprotected intercourse without disclosure. As 
previously stated a person is only reckless if they take an unjustified risk – a risk that 
no reasonable person would take in all the circumstances. Is it possible that a jury 
might accept that where there was a very high probability of violence being used 
against a HIV positive person upon disclosure of status and/or insistence on use of 
precautions, that it may be reasonable to run the risk of transmission by having 
unprotected sexual intercourse? Should a person be able to balance the certainty of 
negative consequences of revealing his/her HIV positive status (and/or requesting that 
precautions are used) against the uncertain risk of transmission?141 Consider also 
cases of vaginal penetration where it is the female partner who is infected - could it 
not be argued that the risk of violence women face by disclosing their HIV status is 
greater than the risk their male partners face of female to male transmission and that 
accordingly unprotected intercourse may be justified?142 It is perhaps unlikely that 
such arguments would be accepted. A court would be reluctant to send out a message 
that unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosure could ever be justified 
particularly if it regularly occurred within an ongoing relationship.143 Moreover, if as 
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is widely accepted, the ultimate aim of any measure dealing with HIV transmission is 
to prevent the spread of the disease, it may seem strange for the law to adopt a 
position whereby it completely excused non disclosure and failure to take precaution 
either by means of a specific defence or by treating such conduct as justified in certain 
circumstances and therefore not reckless. Perhaps a fairer solution would be for 
difficulties regarding disclosure or taking of precaution to be treated as relevant when 
assessing blameworthiness as distinct from determining recklessness. For example 
such difficulties, if they were found to exist, could be treated as mitigating factors 
when sentencing.144   
Before leaving the issue of use of precaution there are two final points that 
deserve brief mention. Firstly, it should be recognised that failure to take precaution 
does not always stem from callousness. Many HIV positive individuals act 
responsibly and use protection but, like all humans, such individuals are fallible.145 
The defendant in the Konzani case had both protected and unprotected intercourse 
with 2 of the complainants and stated in relation to one of them that he had sexual 
intercourse without a condom because “the entire sex thing happened so fast”. It may 
be that in the heat of the moment precaution is not taken. It is recognised that given 
the seriousness of the risks associated with such a failure there may be a general 
unwillingness to excuse such conduct. Moreover it would be expected that if 
intercourse without protection occurred in the heat of the moment that disclosure of 
HIV status would be made so that the partner exposed to the risk of infection could 
receive treatment. The failure to disclose in such circumstances would for many 
justify a finding of criminal liability. Yet it is important to remember that not all those 
who fail to use condoms are dangerous pariahs.146 Secondly, it needs to be recognised 
that some HIV prevention messages are now recommending risk reduction strategies 
within unprotected sex, which people may act on in a genuine attempt to be 
responsible and avoid HIV transmission.147 It would seem harsh if having relied on 
such information that criminal liability remained a possibility. The law must make 
clear its position regarding such advice.    
 
‘VICTIM’ AWARENESS OF RISK AND WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT IT  
 
Victim awareness of the risk of infection and willingness to accept it is the final factor 
to be considered when determining the justifiability of a risk. This is the one issue that 
has been considered to some extent by the courts in the cases decided to date. As 
previously mentioned consent by a sexual partner to run the risk of infection with HIV 
provides a defence to a criminal charge of recklessly transmitting the disease.148 
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Concern has already been expressed in this paper as to the meaning given to 
‘informed consent’ which in almost all circumstances effectively requires disclosure 
by the HIV positive person of their status and the distinction made in Konzani 
between running a risk and consenting to it.149 By making this distinction the Court of 
Appeal appears to be saying that those who willingly choose to run the risk of 
infection are not responsible for the consequences of doing so. The victim’s own risk-
taking and irresponsibility is effectively ignored.150 There are two main objections to 
this approach. Firstly, it places sole responsibility for risk-taking upon the infected 
person. However, as many commentators have argued, this is an area of law in which 
mutual responsibility should be acknowledged.151 In the context of consensual sexual 
relations, where there has neither been deceit nor disclosure, the partners together take 
the risk of transmission.152 If a person is aware of the risks associated with 
unprotected sex and has not enquired about the HIV status of a sexual partner then 
he/she must accept the consequences which follow, even if that includes infection 
with HIV. The author is in complete agreement with Weait that in such circumstances 
the defence of consent should in principle be available.153 Secondly, a stance which 
absolves the uninfected individual of the need to take responsibility for his/her own 
sexual health runs counter to the public health message that has been put forward in 
relation to AIDS prevention.154 The core of the prevention message is built around the 
idea of safer sex by all as opposed to disclosure by those infected.155 Whilst some may 
view ‘safer sex’ ethics as immoral or selfish (allowing HIV infected people to put 
their desires and needs ahead of their obligations to others), it must be recognised that 
the idea of safer sex developed out of an appreciation of the need to take seriously 
human fallibility when it comes to sexual behaviour.156 By promoting a move away 
from ideas of personal and shared responsibility to assumptions about the responsible 
behaviours of others, the UK approach to criminalising HIV transmission undermines 
this public health message.157 Furthermore, the current legal approach could create a 
false sense of security among HIV-negative individuals leading them to assume that, 
given the risk of criminal prosecution, sexual partners would disclose their status 
before engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse.158 This could in turn lead to more 
risk-taking and more infections. 
 The law needs to recognise (more widely than it currently does) that a valid 
consent to run the risk of infection can exist in the absence of disclosure. However it 
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is possible that a distinction can be made between consent given where there has been 
no disclosure about HIV positive status and consent given when the person infected 
has actively deceived his/her sexual partner about his status. Bennett, Draper and Frith 
argue that consent given in the context of non-disclosure may still be regarded as 
including consent to run the risk of infection as an individual is not necessarily being 
deceived when a sexual partner does not disclose his status – in other words the 
failure to disclose does not always preclude an autonomous choice.159 The writers 
suggest that where a person knows how HIV is transmitted it is possible to argue that 
any consent given to high risk activity includes consent to the risk of infection.160 
However the situation is different when there has been active deception as to status. 
This is because deception undermines autonomous decision–making.161 Accordingly 
it may be appropriate in such instances to regard any consent given as vitiated by the 
deception and to treat the conduct of the infected person as criminally reckless. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is recognised that the question of justifiability of risk-taking is a question that has 
been marginalised in the modern criminal law of recklessness generally.162 However it 
is contended that in order to develop an approach to criminalisation of HIV 
transmission which takes account of the social, psychological, medical and public 
health realities of HIV, the question of justifiability of risk-taking must be brought 
from the margins and become a key part of the determination of criminal liability. A 
narrow approach to recklessness, confined to mere awareness of a risk of 
transmission, potentially spreads the net of criminal liability for reckless transmission 
of HIV too broadly. It excludes from consideration of liability important factors such 
as seriousness of risk, likelihood of risk occurring, social utility of conduct involved, 
mutual responsibility, distribution of risk amongst sexual partners and the ability to 
disclose one’s infected status and/or use precautions. Under such a narrow approach 
to criminal liability sex is effectively treated like a contract, something entered into by 
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two rational and equal individuals, each thinking clearly about his or her needs and 
goals and about the importance of respecting his or her partner’s autonomy. However, 
sex is the “paradigmatic passionate activity in human life” and an approach to 
criminalisation which requires us to be “dispassionate” in our decisions about it is 
unrealistic.163 Moreover, partners in sexual relationships are not always in a position 
of equal power and this inequality can affect a person’s ability to control when and 
how they have sex. By considering the issue of justifiability of risk-taking, it is 
possible, as has been demonstrated, to take the wider reality of HIV transmission into 
account and to develop a more balanced and just view of precisely what risk-taking 
with respect to HIV transmission deserves to be subject to criminal sanction. 
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